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On Population Structure and Marriage Dynamics
* 
 
I develop an equilibrium, two-sided search model of marriage with endogenous population 
growth to study the interaction between fertility, the age structure of the population and the 
age at first marriage of men and women. Within a simple two-period overlapping generation 
model I show that, given an increase of the desired number of children, age at marriage is 
affected through two different channels. First, as population growth increases, the age 
structure of the population produces a thicker market for young people, inducing early 
marriages. The second channel comes from differential fecundity: if the desired number of 
children is not feasible for older women, women tend to marry younger and men older, with 
single men outnumbering single women in equilibrium. Using an extended version of the 
model to a finite number of periods and fertility data, I show that two mechanisms described 
above may have acted as persistence mechanisms after the U.S “baby boom”. I show that 
demographic transitional dynamics after the baby boom may account for approximately a 
23% of the increase in men’s age of marriage between 1985 and 2009, albeit the impact on 
women’s age is small. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J12, D83 
  






Department of Economics 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
C/Madrid, 126 
Getafe (Madrid) 28903 
Spain 
E-mail: egiolito@eco.uc3m.es   
 
                                                 
* This paper benefited from discussions with Nezih Guner and Seth Sanders. I also thank Javier Diaz-
Gimenez, John Knowles and Yoram Weiss, participants at the conference “Income Distribution and the 
Family” (Kiel), and at seminars at Duke University, University of Arhus and Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid for their helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish 
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Grants BEC2006-05710 and ECO2009-11165) and of the 
European Commission (MRTN-CT-2003-50496). Errors are mine. 1. Introduction
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between fertility, the age structure of the population
and the timing of marriage of men and women. Looking at the evolution of those variables in
the U.S., we observe several facts that suggest the existence of such a relationship. First, the
median age of marriage of men and women appears to be negatively correlated with the total
fertility rate (TFR), although with a delay.1 Observe in Panel (a) of Figure 1 that fertility rates
sharply fall from the early sixties to the mid seventies, while the age of marriage of men and
women starts to unambiguously increase only when fertility rates become stable.
The relationship between marriage timing and fertility can be reconciled if we take a closer
look at the demographic implications of the U.S. "Baby Boom". Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows the
evolution of the share of population aged 15-29 years-old of those aged 15-44, together with the
TFR; this measure of the demographic structure mimics fertility rate with a lag of about 20 years.
Speci￿cally, this share starts increasing in the early sixties, when the early "boomers" became
15 year-olds and peaks in the mid-seventies, when they turned 30, then decrease until the mid-
nineties. Panel (c) shows the comparison between demographic structure and the median age
of marriage of men and women. Notice that both measures of marriage timing start increasing
approximately at the same time the population starts to become older again, around 1975.
Second, fertility and marriage timing are related to the age gap at marriage between men
and women. As shown in Panel (d) of Figure 1, the di⁄erence between the average age at
￿rst marriage for men and appears to show a positive correlation with the total fertility rate,
increasing from the forties to around the end of the baby boom, in 1963.2 Notice also in Panel
(e) the positive correlation between the sex ratio and the age gap in the time series, and in
Panel (f) that the evolution in the sex ratio does not appear to follow changes in the relative
total quantity of men and women, at least since 1940.3 It is common in the empirical marriage
literature to use the single sex ratio (or "availability ratio") as an exogenous measure of one
sex scarcity that a⁄ects the relative timing of marriage of men and women.4 As I will show
later, the sex ratio and the age gap are jointly determined and their relationsip not necessarily
depends on sex imbalances.
In this paper, I will argue that the timing of marriage for men and women is a⁄ected by two
endogenous sources of frictions. The ￿rst one is the age structure of the population, which is
a function of past fertility and produces a "thicker market externality" that induces men and
women to marry earlier when the population becomes younger. The second is the ratio of single
men and single women, which produces asymmetries in marriage opportunities for men and
women. I will show in this paper that the age gap and the sex imbalances are jointly determined
by the behavior of the agents.
In Section 2 I present the basic, steady state model. Speci￿cally, I develop an overlapping
generations general equilibrium model with two-sided search in which agents only di⁄er in their
1Throughout this paper I use the median age at ￿rst marriage as a measure of marriage timing, because
population structure is a key factor in this paper. The U.S. Census Bureau has annually published the estimated
median age at ￿rst marriage since 1947, using an indirect method based on the proportion of people who were
ever married within the single age cohort. This methodology prevents the age of marriage from being a⁄ected
mechanically by population structure. Since the mean age of marriage is conditional on marriage, this measure
is subject to those mechanical e⁄ects. However, I use the mean of the age at ￿rst marriage in order to calculate
the age gap.
2In contrast to the previous marriage literature, which assumes that the age di⁄erence is constant, Ni BrolchÆin
(2001), has shown that the age gap changes according to the size of the cohorts.
3However, total and single sex ratios appear to be correlated between 1900 and 1940.
4See, for example, Fitzgerald (1991), McLaughlin et al. (1993), and Parrado and Centeno (2002).
2age and are able to marry once in their lifetimes. I assume that they live as adults for two
periods and that they obtain utility from the (idiosyncratic) quality of their marriage and from
the joy of having children. I also assume that both men and women desire to have a given
number of children, which I keep as exogenous. Given desired fertility, population growth and
therefore the age structure of the population are endogenous. In this model, as people get older
they become less attractive to their prospective younger mates. In the case of both sexes, this
is because younger spouses know that they will lose the utility of being married relatively early
in life when their older spouse dies. In addition, for women, the disutility of aging increases
because they lose their fecundity relatively early.
Given the above assumptions, I show that, given an increase of the desired number of children,
age at marriage is a⁄ected through two di⁄erent channels. First, as population growth increases,
the age structure of the population becomes "younger" which reduces the frictions that men and
women face in order to meet other younger counterparts, and therefore increases their likelihood
to marry younger. The second channel comes from di⁄erential fecundity: if the biological
constraints for older women are binding, young men become more reluctant to marry older
women. Consequently, young women anticipate their shorter fecundity horizon and reduce their
reservation match quality for both younger and older men. Therefore, women increase their
likelihood of marrying older men, who have a greater willingness to marry than younger men.
In the steady state equilibrium, as young women are more likely to marry older men, young men
are (relatively) more likely to wait and single men will outnumber single women.
To study the empirical implications of the results above, in Section 3 I extend the basic
model to a full life-cycle model with people living a ￿nite numbers of yearly periods and where
men and women di⁄er not only in fecundity but also in mortality. In order to use this extended
model to study potential impact that the "baby boom" may have had on marriage dynamics, I
proceed in two steps, detailed in Section 4. First, I assume that the economy in its steady state
and calibrate the model parameters to U.S. 1930 demographics, to obtain a steady state Then,
since desired fertility is exogenous in this model, I take those parameters from the U.S. time
series data and assume that desired fertility reaches a new steady state value in 1977. From that
year onwards, marriage timing is exclusively a⁄ected by a persistence mechanism that is caused
by the change of the age structure of the population due to the "baby boom".
The main ￿ndings of the calibration exercise are shown in Section 5. I ￿nd that the tran-
sitional dynamics of the model causes the age of marriage to slowly adjust to the steady state,
particularly in the case of men. Speci￿cally, I ￿nd that the decline in fertility in the period 1957-
1976 may account for 23% of the increase in men￿ s median age of marriage occurring between
1985 and 2009. In the benchmark model, men￿ s age at ￿rst marriage increases until the age
structure of the population reaches its steady state level (around the year 2040 in the model).
The reason for such slow adjustment resides in the impact that demographic structure has on
the sex ratio, increasing men￿ s matching rates with respect to women￿ s at the beginning of the
transition period, that is, when a large share of people on marriageable age are young "baby
boomers". For the same reason, the impact on women￿ s marriage timing is small.
In order to understand the how much the demographic structure may have in￿ uenced men￿ s
slow convergence to the steady state, I perform two counterfactual experiments. In the ￿rst
experiment, I assume that fertility rates converge slowly from the 1940 levels to the replacement
rate, as if the "baby boom" never occurred. In the second experiment, I assume that even if there
is an increase in desired fertility from the 1945 to 1965, it has no impact on in the demographic
structure, so I only keep the partial equilibrium e⁄ects. What I ￿nd in either case is that men
would have reached their steady state median age at ￿rst marriage in the mid eighties, around
3￿fty years earlier than in the benchmark model.
Review of the literature.
The earliest work in economics devoted to the explanation of the age gap between men and
women is based on gender roles of traditional societies. Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) present
a model with incomplete information where women are valued as marriage partners for their
ability to bear children and to manage a household, and men are valued for their ability to
make money. Women￿ s ability is observable earlier in life than men￿ s ability, which is private
knowledge. Therefore, men who expect to be successful delay marriage until they are able to
give a signal that allows them to attract more desirable women.
Siow (1998) introduced the issue of the shorter fecundity period of women in the economics
literature. In a two-period model with uncertainty about human capital accumulation, and
where utility comes exclusively from having children, old and young men (all fertile) compete
for young, fertile women. Consequently, some old men, those who successfully obtain a higher
wage, are able to marry, displacing some of the young men in the competition over scarce fertile
women.
This paper shares several features of the works mentioned. For example, as in Siow (1998),
women have a shorter fecundity period than men. However, in this paper, population growth
is endogenous, which allows me to explore the role of the demographic structure in marriage
timing, not only by comparing two steady states but also by exploring the transitional dynamics
from one steady state to the other.5 The observed relationship between sex imbalances and the
age gap makes search models particularly useful to analyze this problem.6
Section 2 of the paper builds on Giolito (2004), who models the age of the individuals
both as a state variable and as a source of agents￿heterogeneity, in a framework with ex-ante
heterogeneous agents and non-transferrable utility (NTU) focused exclusively on the steady state
with no population growth.7 More recently, D￿az-GimØnez and Giolito (2009) have developed a
full life-cycle setting that accounts for di⁄erences in fecundity, earnings and mortality pro￿les
between men and women. Focusing also in the steady state with no population growth, they ￿nd
that di⁄erential fecundity is all that matter to account for age di⁄erences at ￿rst marriage, and
that the distribution of age di⁄erences along the life cycle, which is increasing in age for men,
and decreasing (in absolute value) in the age of women is also more consistent with a partially
random matching search model that with a model where people exclusively meet within their
own age group. Di⁄erentt form that work, the model on Section 3 is developed to study the
transitional dynamics of the model after a demographic shock and the factors causing a slow
adjustment in the age of marriage.
The present work is also related to previous studies on marriage timing, for example, Caucutt,
Guner and Knowles (2002). They study the roles played by wage inequality, human capital
accumulation, and returns to experience for the timing of marriage and fertility. They show
that highly productive women marry and have children later in life than their less productive
5Another related paper is Tertilt (2005), who also allows for endogenous population growth to study the e⁄ects
of polygyny in certain African countries. Also in the development literature, Edlund (1999) discusses possible
links between son preference in certain Asian countries and marriage patterns (for example spousal age gap, as
here).
6Seitz (2009) studies the impact of imbalances of the total sex ratio (like mortality or immigration) on dif-
ferences in the marriage timing between whites and blacks. Di⁄erently from this paper, she does not allow for
marriage across cohorts, and therefore the sex ratio is only a⁄ected by exogenous shocks on the total population
of men and women.
7Following Burdett and Coles (1997) and Smith (2006), there is extensive literature in NTU equilibrium search
models of marriage. See Burdett and Coles (1999) for a survey. More recent examples include Bloch and Ryder
(2000), Cornelius (2003), Burdett et al. (2004), Wong (2003).and Coles and Francesconi (2007).
4colleagues. With a richer structure than this model, they abstract from cross-age marriages and
from population growth.
Recently, Coles and Francesconi (2007) analyzed a two-sided search model where men and
women di⁄er in their earnings (which evolve stochastically) and in their ￿tness, which decays
deterministically with age. They show that when market opportunities are similar for both sexes,
then the equilibrium exhibits "toy-boy marriages" (old women with young men) and "toy-girl
marriages" (old men with young women). When labor market opportunities are better for men
than for women, toy-boy marriages disappear. The main di⁄erence with the basic model of
this paper is that Coles and Francesconi abstract from population growth and also assume that
matching rates are independent of demographic structure.8 Therefore, they abstract from the
relationship between the sex ratio and the age gap, which is crucial to this model.
2. A two-period model of marriage
2.1. Demographics
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of men and women who live for three periods, one as
children and two as adults: young (age 1) and old (age 2). Adult men and women derive utility
from being married and from having children, do not discount future, and their main economic
activity is searching for a mate. In the steady state, the population grows every period at a
constant rate n; which is endogenous. Therefore, in any period t, the economy is populated by
Nt young and Nt￿1 old agents, where Nt = Nt￿1 (1 + n) = N0 (1 + n)
t : Since half of the agents
are male and half are female, I assume for simplicity that N0 = 2:
The population dynamics in this economy determines the steady state age structure of the
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which is increasing in the population growth rate.
Each period t, equal measures sw
1;t of young single women and sm
1;t of young single men enter
the economy, where sm
1;t = sw
1;t = (1 + n)
t;. Consequently, every period there is a measure,
Sw
t = (1 + n)
t + sw
2;t, of single women in the economy, of which (1 + n)
t are young and sw
2;t are
old, with n and sw
2;t endogenous. Similarly, there is a measure, Sm
t = (1 + n)
t + sm
2;t, of single
men, of which (1 + n)
t are young and sm
2;t are old. Therefore, the ratio of single men to single




t is also endogenous.
Since men and women marry in pairs, the total number of brides, w1;t young plus w2;t old,
must be equal to the total of grooms, h1:t young plus h2;t old. Since in the steady state the sex
ratio is constant, ￿t = ￿; the fact that every period an equal number of young men and women
enter the market requires the number of men who exit the marriage market either because they
marry, or because they die single also to be equal to the number of women who leave the market.
Consequently,
w1;t + w2;t + um




t denote the number of men and women who die unmarried, respectively. Notice
that condition (2) and the fact that people marry in pairs imply that um
t = uw
t .
8They assume that the population of unmarried men is always equal to the population of unmarried women.
52.2. Matching technology
I assume that singles of both ages meet randomly at most once every period and decide whether
or not to marry. Once married, both men and women remain so until the end of their lives and
people whose spouse dies are not allowed to search for a new spouse.9 Whenever a man and a
woman meet, either one can propose marriage to the other. If they both accept, they marry.
Otherwise they both stay single.
The total number of meetings between singles is represented, in the spirit of Pissarides (1990),






where ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿ 2 (0; 1
2]:10 As is standard in the search and matching literature, the








Similarly, a single woman meets a single man with probability ￿w = ￿(￿)
￿ : Since the sex ratio
is fully endogenous in this economy, here the matching function also captures the way in which
the aggregate e⁄ects of the marriage decision feed back into the individual decision problem.
The probability that an individual meets either a young or and old agent of the opposite sex
depends on the age structure of the single population. For example, the probability that a single
man meets a single young woman is ￿mpw
1 and the probability of meeting an old single women
is given by ￿mpw
2 = ￿m (1 ￿ pw





t is the fraction of single women of age a; which
is constant in the steady state. Similarly, from a single women point of view, the probabilities
of meeting a young and an old man are given by ￿wpm
1 and ￿w (1 ￿ pm
1 ); respectively.11
2.3. Payo⁄s
The table below describes the utility that people derive from their marital status. I assume that
married people derive utility both from the match quality and from the number of children they
are able to have with a given spouse, and the utility of being single is normalized to zero. I




children during their lifetime, where each
"child" is a pair of twins, one girl and one boy. I also assume that women bear all their children
in the same period they marry. Finally, men and women di⁄er in their fecundity horizons. On
one hand, while young women are able to bear k children, old women are only capable of bearing
at most one child. On the other hand, men of age 1 and of age 2 are able to have k children.
The utility that a woman derives from being married to a speci￿c man depends also on the
man￿ s type, assumed to be a random variable with cumulative distribution Gm (y), support in
[0;y], and mean ￿y. Similarly, I assume that the utility that a man derives from being married
to a speci￿c woman depends on the woman￿ s type, which is a random variable with cumulative
9For a model of marriage with endogenous separations, see Brien, Lillard and Stern (2002) and Cornelius
(2003). Moreover, Chiappori and Weiss (2006) examine equilibrium divorce incentives where there is a thick
market externality in the remarriage market.
10Given that the sex ratio can be unbalanced in equilibrium, I assume that ￿ is small enough to ensure that the
matching probabilities are not higher than one. The interval assumed for ￿ ensures the uniqueness of a symmetric
equilibrium in a two-period economy.


















6distribution Gw (x), support in [0;x], and mean ￿x. I further assume that both cumulative
distributions are continuous and di⁄erentiable, and that their probability density functions are
gm (y) and gw (x); respectively. Since I assume that singles are homogeneous in their quality,
the distributions Gm and Gw are identical across singles, and the realizations that people draw
at each meeting are independent.12
For example, if a young woman marries a young man, their utilities are 2ky and 2kx, because
the marriage will last for two periods. If a young woman marries an old man, they will also
receive ky and kx but only for one period. On the other hand, if a young man marries an old
woman, their utilities are only minfk;1gx and minfk;1gy for one period, respectively. Since old
women are less fecund and only able to bear one child, they receive the same utility regardless
of the age of their spouse. Furthermore, since in the model economy people who do not marry
miss out on the joys of both companionship and childbearing, I normalize to zero the utility of
being single.
Payo⁄s for Men and Women
Young Spouse Old Spouse
Women
Marry young 2ky ky
Marry old minfk;1gy minfk;1gy
Never marry 0 0
Men
Marry young 2kx minfk;1gx
Marry old kx minfk;1gx
Never marry 0 0
In order to ensure existence of an equilibrium, I assume that the maximum value of k is such
that the utility of marrying an average spouse and having k children with them is not higher











2.4. The decision problem of singles
Since people match randomly in our economy, the single men￿ s problem is to choose reservation
values for young and old single women. Let Rm
a;b denote the steady state reservation value that
single men of age a set for single women of age b, and, similarly, let Rw
b;a be the reservation
values that age b single women set for age a single men. Since I assume that people meet only
once per period, and that they derive zero utility from being single, the reservation values of
old single men for both young and old single women is zero, trivially. That is, Rm
2;1 = Rm
2;2 = 0.
Similarly, the reservation values of old single women for both old and young single men are also
zero, that is, Rw
2;1 = Rw
2;2 = 0.13
12The assumption about the two separate distributions for men and women, as in Burdett and Coles (1997) is
made exclusively for analytical tractability and does not a⁄ect the results.
13This rules out the trivial equilibrium where all women reject all marriages because they know that all men
will reject them and vice versa.
72.4.1. Expected utility of marriage for old single people
Denote as ￿
j
a;b the steady state probability that a single agent of age a and gender j 2 fm;wg
marries someone of age b. This probability depends ￿rst, on the probability of meeting someone
of the opposite sex and age b, ￿jp
￿j
b : Given the meeting probability, the probability of marriage
depends on mutual acceptance. That is, for example for men,
￿m
a;b = ￿mpw
b [1 ￿ Gm(Rw





Let us observe the case of old single people. Since I assume that old people who do not
marry obtain zero utility, they accept any marriage o⁄er. For example, if an old single man




1 [1 ￿ Gm(Rw
1;2)] and ￿w
2;1 = ￿wpm





On the other hand, if an old single man meets an old single woman, they marry with
certainty. Without loss of generality, I assume that everybody eventually marries at some point
in life. Consequently, those old men and women that either were unmatched or rejected by
younger counterparts will face a frictionless technology that automatically matches them among
themselves.14 Therefore ￿m
2;2 = [1 ￿ ￿m
2;1] and ￿w
2;2 = [1 ￿ ￿w
2;1].





























2.4.2. Expected Utility of Marriage for Young Single People
Since young single men and women have a chance to marry in the future, they choose their
reservation values taking into account the next period￿ s prospects. For example, provided that a
single young man meets a single young woman (with probability ￿mpw
1 = ￿wpm
1 ), they will marry
if both of them ￿nd each other mutually acceptable. A single young woman will accept a single
young man with probability [1￿Gm(Rw
1;1)]; and he will accept her with probability [1￿Gw(Rm
1;1)].










On the other hand, if young man or woman meets an old single agent of the opposite sex (with
probability ￿mpw
2 or ￿wpm
2 ; respectively), the acceptance of the young agent will be su¢ cient for
marriage to occur. Consequently,
￿m
1;2 = ￿mpw





14This assumption is for convenience, and will be relaxed in the next section, when I study the transitional
dynamics of the model. Recall that by condition (2); steady state implies that an equal number of old men and









for men and women, respectively.
The expected utility of marriage for young single men, Um































2.4.3. The young single people￿ s optimization problem
Young single people of gender j 2 fm;wg choose the reservation values for young and old single




1;2, which maximize their expected lifetime utility. In




























1 stands for the steady state probability that a single individual of gender j marries at
age 1.
The solutions to this problem require a young single agent to be indi⁄erent between marrying
when young or resampling again the following period. If a young single agent meets an old
individual of the opposite sex he/she must compare the utility of a one period marriage with the
value of marrying when old. In the case of a young man who meets an old women, this type of
marriage becomes less valuable if their desired number of children is greater than the one that









The case of a young woman who meets an old man is di⁄erent. Since men of all ages are able
to have k children, she must compare the utility of marrying young with the value of waiting
until the next period and facing the limited fecundity which will be binding in the case where










Now we focus on the reservation values that young singles set for people of their same cohort.
Given that a young single man meets a young single woman (or vice-versa), they have to compare















for j 2 fm;wg:
To obtain the reservation values chosen by the young single men, substituting expression (8)







1 [k ￿ minfk;1g]
￿










1 [k ￿ minfk;1g]
￿










Notice that the young single men￿ s reservation values depend positively on the average match
quality of single women, ￿x, and on the di⁄erence between their desired number of children and
the number that old women are capable to bear (k ￿ minfk;1g): When the desired number of












1 [k ￿ 1]
￿










1 [k ￿ 1]
￿





which are increasing on the probability of meeting a single young woman, ￿mpw
1 ; and decreasing
on Rw
1;2; i.e., the reservation value of young single women for old single men. Naturally, when Rw
1;2
decreases, that is, when it becomes more likely that young single women accept the proposals
of old single men, young men are more willing to wait and therefore become choosier. Finally,
notice that while Rm
1;1 is decreasing in the desired number of children, k, Rm
1;2 is increasing in k.
That is, as the desired number of children increases, young men become choosier with respect
to old women and less choosy with young women.












Notice that, in this case, when fecundity is binding (k > 1); the reservation values that young
women set for all men become decreasing functions of their desired number of children.15
15Notice that the reservation values of men and women are all continuous in the value of the parameter k,
which allows us to ￿nd an equilibrium for each value of k.
102.5. Steady state demographics
2.5.1. The number of single men and women
This section presents the endogenous number of single people in the steady state economy as a
function of the probabilities of marriage at age 1, ￿
j
i for j 2 fm;wg and the rate of population
growth, n.
Since the population of old single men and women is composed of the unmarried young singles
of the previous period, and given that the population of young singles is sm
1;t = sw





















2;t = (1 + n)
t￿1 ￿
2 + n ￿ ￿j￿
(27)













2 + n ￿ ￿j; (28)







2 + n ￿ ￿m
2 + n ￿ ￿w : (29)
Note that in the steady state the sex ratio and the fractions of young single people are
constant. Moreover, the fractions of young singles depend positively on the population growth
rate.
2.5.2. Fertility and population growth
To obtain the rate of population growth, recall that a woman that marries at age 1 is capable of
having k pairs of twins, and that a woman who does so at age 2 is able to bear only one pair of
twins. Given those assumptions, we have that the number of young men and women who enter







1;t = (1 + n)
t, substituting (26) in (30);and manipulating we have
(1 + n)
2 = k(1 + n)￿w + minfk;1g(1 ￿ ￿w): (31)
Solving the quadratic equation (31) and taking the positive root we have that the rate of pop-







2 + 4minfk;1g(1 ￿ ￿w)
2
: (32)
Notice that women￿ s fecundity is normalized to obtain n = 0 when k = 1: The population
growth reaches its minimum when k = 0:5 and ￿w = 1 (n = ￿0:5) and its maximum when k = k
and ￿w = 1
￿
n = k ￿ 1
￿
:
112.6. Steady State Equilibrium
2.6.1. Marriage market clearing
Since men and women marry in pairs, the total number of brides must be equal to the total of







People marrying within their cohort. The condition above is trivially satis￿ed when a =
b = 1, since sm
1;t = sw
1;t = (1 + n)
t and, by (10); ￿m
1;1 = ￿w
1;1:
People marrying across cohorts













































































Given a desired number of children, k; a steady state equilibrium for this economy is a vector
of reservation values for young single men, Rm
1 = (Rm
1;1;Rm
1;2), a vector of reservation values
for young single women, Rw
1 = (Rw
1;1;Rw
1;2); a probability of marriage for young single men,
￿m = ￿m
1;1 + ￿m
1;2, a probability of marriage for young single women, ￿w = ￿w
1;1 + ￿w
1;2, and a
population growth rate n; such that:
(i) Given Rw
1 ; ￿m, ￿w and n, Rm
1 solves the young single men￿ s decision problem described in
expression (15), and is determined by equations (20) and (21):
(ii) Given Rm
1 ; ￿m, ￿w and n, Rw
1 solves the young single women￿ s decision problem described
in expression (15), and is determined by equations (24) and (25):
(iii) The young men￿ s probability of marriage, ￿m; determined by (10) and (11); is consistent
with the reservation values chosen both by the young single men and the young single
women, the probability of marriage of young single women and the rate of population
growth.
(iv) The young women￿ s probability of marriage, ￿w; determined by (10) and (12); is consis-
tent with the reservation values chosen both by the young single men and women, the
probability of marriage of young single men and the rate of population growth.
12(v) The rate of population growth, n, determined by (32), is consistent with the reservation
values and marriage probabilities of single young men and women.16
(vi) Marriage market clears, by (34) and (35):
2.6.3. Existence
Here I show the existence of a steady state equilibrium for this economy. Notice that, by
expression (20), Rm
1;1 is uniquely determined by Rm
1;2: In addition, the reservation values of
women are completely determined by k and ￿y (equations (24) and (25)): Therefore, I have to
show the existence of an interior solution of a system of four equations in four unknowns: Rm
1;2;
￿m; ￿w and n:
Theorem 1 (Existence). A steady state equilibrium exists for this economy.
Proof. To proof existence I use Brouwer￿ s Fixed Point Theorem. See Appendix A.1
The following result rules out the existence of corner solutions and establishes that in equi-
librium marriages across cohorts occur with positive probability.






















Proof. See Appendix A.1
2.7. Equilibrium characterization
In this section I characterize the equilibrium of the economy, assuming that the distribution
of types is identical for men and women, that is Gm = Gw = G, denoting its mean by ￿.
The analysis is divided into two parts. Next, I analyze the case where old women￿ s biological
restriction is not binding (k ￿ 1): This case is called "symmetric" because the decision problems
faced by the single men and the single women are identical. Then, in Section 2.7.2 I analyze
the case of di⁄erential fecundity, that is, when the desired fertility is higher than the number of
children that old women are capable of bearing.













2;2), are also part of the steady state equilibrium of this economy. However, as shown in
Section 2.4, they are trivially zero, and I have omitted them from the de￿nition of the equilibrium for the sake of
simplicity.
132.7.1. Symmetric case
Consider the case were people desire to have k 2 [0:5;1] children.17 Consequently, di⁄erential
fecundity plays no role because the decision problems faced by the single men and the single
women are identical. Moreover, in this case the reservation values of single men and single
women are identical, and so are the numbers of single men and single women in the economy.
Notice that in this case the reservation values of men and women are independent of their desired
fertility.
Assumption 1. Gm = Gw = G with mean ￿ and density g.
Assumption 2. The probability density function g is log-concave.










1;2 = ￿: (37)
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, if people only want to have a number of children that is
biologically feasible for old women, k 2 [1
2;1], there is always a steady state equilibrium where
men and women marry at age 1 with equal probability, ￿m = ￿w = ￿s; and where population
is not increasing over time, n ￿ 0. This implies that the number of single men is equal to
the number of single women, Sm
t = Sw
t ; and therefore the sex ratio is equal to one, ￿ = 1.
Furthermore, the economy is mostly populated by old agents, q ￿ 1
2.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 ,there is a unique steady state equilibrium for
k 2 [1
2;1].
Proof. See Appendix A.3
Given that men and women face identical problems the existence of an unique equilibrium
where men and women marry at the same age seems trivial. However, the interesting feature of
the symmetric case comes from comparative statics. As we show below, when men and women
are identical, an increase in the desired number of children leads to men and women marrying
earlier as population growth increases, despite the constant reservation rules derived above.
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if k 2 [1
2;1); given an increase in the desired
number of children:
1. Population growth rate increases: @n
@k > 0: This implies that the fraction of young people
in the economy increases:
q
@k > 0:
2. Men and women marry at age 1 with higher probability: @￿s
@k > 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
17Note that the results depend exclusively on symmetry and not on the negative population growth rates implied
by the assumption of k ￿ 1: This assumption is made merely for expositional reasons and will be relaxed in the
next section.
14The result above comes from the interaction between young people￿ s preferences for marrying
within their cohort and the e⁄ect of desired fertility on the age structure of the population.
When k increases, population growth increases and therefore the age structure of the economy
is a⁄ected, with a larger share of young people q = 1+n
2+n: Therefore young people meet people of
the same cohort with higher probability. Since young agents obtain higher utility from marrying
other young people (and therefore set lower reservation values for them), they tend to marry
younger as age the structure of population is also becoming younger.
2.7.2. Di⁄erential fecundity
Now consider the case where people desire to have k 2 (1;k] children. If k > 1; old women
are not able to bear their desired number of children. As shown in Section 2.4.1, if men wait
until age 2 they still can marry a young woman and have k children. Recall from (8) that the








the other hand, if women wait until age 2, they will get the same utility regardless of whom
they marry, Uw
2 = ￿; (9): Since in equilibrium ￿m
2;1 > 0 (from Theorem 1), this implies that
di⁄erential fecundity increases the value of waiting for men. Therefore, men become relatively
choosier than women.
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1, if people want to have more children than those that old
women are able to bear k 2 (1;k], there is always a steady state equilibrium where young men











































From simple observation of (24) and (25) it is clear that women￿ s reservation values both for
young and old men old men are decreasing in k: From Proposition 6 we know that if di⁄erential
fecundity plays a role, men are choosier than women. The previous result does not imply that
as desired fertility increases men￿ s reservation values will necessarily increase. In fact, as I show
below, if desired fertility increases men also reduce their reservation values for young women,
but to a lesser extent than women do. However, young men will increase their reservation values
for older women, which is the main driving force behind the di⁄erence in the timing of marriage.
Proposition 7. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, then in the neighborhood of the unique steady
state equilibrium where k = 1, given a small increase in the desired number of children:







@k < 0: In the latter case, the decrease in the reservation value is lower than the















152. Women marry young with higher probability: @￿w
@k > 0: In addition, the di⁄erence between
the probability of marriage at age 1 of women and men, ￿w￿￿m, is positive and increasing
in k.
3. The ratio of single men to single women, ￿, is greater than 1 and increasing in k.
4. Similarly to Proposition 5, population growth increases, therefore the fraction of young
people in the economy, q increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.5
Proposition 7 establishes that when people desire to have more children than the number that
a woman who marries at age 2 is able to bear, di⁄erential fecundity plays a role and single men
become choosier than single women. Consequently, single women tend to marry younger than
men, and the age gap is an increasing function of the desired number of children. Moreover, it
establishes that, as the desired number of children increases, single men increasingly outnumber
single women.
The mechanism behind Proposition 7 is the following. If people in the economy want to have
a number of children that is feasible for women that marry at age 2, the biological di⁄erences
between men and women play no role in the marriage market. However, biological gender
asymmetries do appear if society want to have more children than those that women of age 2 are
able to bear (k > 1). Therefore, young men are less willing than young women to accept an older
spouse and the value of waiting until age 2 increases for men relative to women. Notice that
men also decrease their reservation values for young women (albeit in a lesser extent) because
if they wait they may not be able to marry a young woman when old.
The increase in the sex ratio is the necessary counterpart of the increase in the age gap. As
young women are more likely to marry old men, in equilibrium more young men have to wait
until period 2 in order to marry. Therefore, it must be the case that single men outnumber
single women. 18
Notice that while an increase in k makes women unambiguously marry younger, it has
ambiguous e⁄ects on men￿ s timing of marriage. In the case of men there are two countervailing
e⁄ects: because of di⁄erential fecundity, they tend to marry older as k increases, but because of
the change in the demographic structure they would marry younger (Proposition 5). These two
e⁄ects will be analyzed in more detail in the next section when we study the model dynamics.
As we will see later, the transitional dynamics of the model is particularly a⁄ected by the level
of the sex ratio, ￿t, which acts as a persistence factor in determining the age gap, and by the
evolution of the age structure of the population, qt, which a⁄ects the marriage timing.
3. A generalized model
In this section I extend the model developed in Section 2 to a full life cycle model with a ￿nite
number of yearly periods. The objective of this extension is to study the empirical implications
of the model developed above, speci￿cally the dynamics of marriage behavior in the U.S. after
the period known as the "baby boom". Since in this stylized model desired fertility is considered
18As stated in the Introduction, this result has implications in light of the empirical literature on marriage
timing. It is a common practice in this literature to use the single sex ratio as a measure of relative availability of
men and women, ignoring the endogeneity problem caused by the relationship between the sex ratio and the age
gap. See, for example, Fitzgerald (1991), McLaughlin et al. (1993), and Parrado and Centeno (2002).
16exogenous, the "baby boom" will be modeled as a shock on desired fertility. However, our main
focus of interest will not be this period itself, but mainly the marriage behavior of the generations
born during and after the "baby boom", a⁄ected by the demographic changes caused by this
large temporary increase in fertility rates.
In this section, I study a model economy populated by a continuum of men and a continuum
of women. Men and women live for at most J years, which we denote with subindex j =
15;16;:::;J. Men and women in this model economy di⁄er in their fecundity, and in their
longevity. And they derive utility from being married and having children. From now on I relax
the assumption of the constant population growth rate maintained thorough Section 2.
3.1. Mortality
In our model economy each period every person faces an exogenous probability of dying until
the following period. We denote these probabilities by ￿i
j;t, for i 2 fm;wg and we assume that
they are gender, age and time dependent. Since people live at most for J periods, ￿m
J;t = ￿w
J;t = 1
for any period t = 1;2;:::. These assumptions also imply that the probability that a person of











Costly double sided search for spouses is a distinguishing feature of our model economies. The
probabilities of being matched depend on an exogenous parameter that measures the search
frictions, and on the ratio of available singles. Let si
j;t denote the number of j year-old singles





j;t denote the total number of singles of gender i.
















where parameter 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 measures the search frictions.19
In this model economy the decision problems of single men and women are exactly identical.
For notational convenience I describe the problem and variables that pertain to single men only.
To obtain the corresponding variables for single women simply substitute the m￿ s for w￿ s and
the b￿ s for a￿ s.
3.3. Fecundity
The expected number of children depends on an exogenous, time varying parameter that desired
fertility kt and biological constraints based on men￿ s and women￿ s age. (determined at the time
of marriage) and biological constraints. Even though this is not an easy matter, I will make the
19Notice that this matching function is di⁄erent from the one in expression (3). While the model of Section 2
required di⁄erentiability in the matching function, keeping the same function would add one more free parameter
to the calibration exercise. This change does not a⁄ect the results at all.
17following assumptions that are roughly consistent with the literature on the subject.20; 21 De￿ne
as cm
t (a;b) the number of children that a man of age a expects to have if he marries at time t a




> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
kt if a ￿ 55 and b ￿ 30
min [kt;3] if a ￿ 55 and 30 < b ￿ 35
min [kt;2:5] if a ￿ 55 and 35 < b ￿ 38
min [kt;2] if a ￿ 55 and 38 < b ￿ 40
min [kt;1] if a ￿ 55 and 41 < b ￿ 44
min [kt;0:5] if a ￿ 55 and 44 < b ￿ 49
0 if a > 55 or b > 49:
(40)
In a similar way cw
t (a;b) is de￿ned.22 Therefore, I assume that men are fecund until age 55 and
women married after age 30 do not have enough time to have more than three children.23
3.4. Payo⁄s from marriage
The period utility of marriage that a single men a obtains from marrying in period t with
someone of age b and a given marriage quality is zcm
t (a;b), where z is an independent and
identically distributed realization from G(z); the same for men and women (Assumption 1).
The period utility of single people is constant endowment of A:24
The expected values of marriage. The value that an a year-old groom expects to obtain from
marrying a b year-old bride who has drawn realization z and has proposed to him is
um





t (a;a + ‘)￿w
t (b;b+‘) (41)
where D = minfJ￿a￿15;J￿b￿15g and ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor.
3.5. The decision problem of singles
The probabilities of marriage. The probability that an a year-old bachelor marries a b year-old
single woman is
￿m
t (a;b) = ￿m
b;t f1 ￿ G[Rm
t (a;b)]gf1 ￿ G[Rw
t (b;a)]g (42)
20According to Wood and Weinstein (1988), women￿ s probability of any conception changes rapidly after age
40, as a result of signi￿cant changes in the ovarian function. Between ages 25 and 40, this probability for women
is remarkably constant. This ￿nding suggests that any reduction in the physiological capacity to bear children
between ages 25 and 40 is attributable to an elevation in intra-uterine mortality rather than to a decline in the
ability to conceive. But, even accounting for intra-uterine loss, the pattern of e⁄ective fecundability remains fairly
￿ at between ages 20 and 35.
21According to Hassan and Killick (2003), the e⁄ect of men￿ s age on fecundity remains uncertain. Experiments
that study the e⁄ect of age on male fecundity have been criticized on methodological grounds for using age at
conception and for not taking into account confounding factors such as the age of the female or coital frequency.
Hassan and Killick study male infecundity by comparing the time to pregnancy ￿ measured from the onset of
the attempts to achieve pregnancy￿ for men of di⁄erent age groups. They found that male aging leads to a
signi￿cant increase in the time to pregnancy, especially after ages 45 to 50.
22Here "2:5 children" should be interpreted as "two children and a 50% probability of a third child".
23This restriction will be only binding during the peak of the baby boom.
24In the two-period model of Section 2, for simplicity this endowment was normalized to 0.
18where Rm
t (a;b) denotes the reservation value that a single man who is a year-old in period t set
for b year-old single women, and Rw
t (a;b) is the reservation value that b year-old single women
set for a year-old bachelors.










b;t f1 ￿ G[Rm
t (a;b)]gf1 ￿ G[Rw
t (b;a)]g (43)
which naturally depends on the reservation values of both men and women.
The expected values of marrying in the current period. The value that an a year-old single







t [a;b;z j z ￿ Rm
t (a;b)] (44)
The expected values of remaining single. Therefore, the expected value of remaining single



















where the ￿rst term in the curly brackets shows the expected value of getting married before a
match takes place and the second term the value of remaining single for one more period.
Reservation values. The optimal reservation values that a year-old men and b year-old
women set for each other in each period can be found solving the system of 2J2￿T equations in
2J2 ￿ T unknowns that result from equating the J2 expressions (41) and (45) for the men and
the corresponding J2 women￿ s equations for periods t = 1;2;3:::T:. Formally, the fRi
t (a;b))g
































3.6. Fertility and Population Dynamics





enter the market. Since now agents live 15 years as children, the population entering the market

















where the expression between curly brackets is the number of children born in period t￿15; $i
t￿15
is the fraction of children of gender i 2 fm;wg and ￿i
t￿15(0;15) is their survival probability up
to age 15.25 The stock of agents of older ages fNi








j￿1;t￿1 for 16 ￿ j ￿ J: (49)
25For the easiness of exposition, Equation (48) implies that all children are born in the ￿rst year of marriage.
Given that this assumption may a⁄ect results signi￿cantly in periods of rapidly changing fertility, when solving
the problem I actually restricted women to having one children per period in up to four consecutive periods.
193.7. Equilibrium De￿nition
Given a vector of desired number of children over time, kt , an equilibrium for this economy is
a vector of measures of 15 year-olds, fNi
15;tg, a matrix of measures of single people, fsi
j;tg for
gender i 2 fm;wg, and matrices of reservation values that single males set for single females and
vice versa, fRm
t (a;b);Rw





15;tg satisfy expression (48) and are consistent with















for j < 15 ￿ J; (51)
where the ￿i
j;tare de￿ned in expression (43); being also consistent with the reservation
values and the measures of 15 year-old people.
(iii) Given Ni
15;t and si
j;t, the reservation values fRm
t (a;b);Rw
t (a;b)g solve the decision problems
of singles described in expressions (46) and (47) and are consistent with the measures of
singles and 15 year-old people.
(iv) Marriage market clears every period, that is
sm
a;t￿m




t (a;b) is de￿ned in expression(42):
4. Calibration
To calibrate the model economy we must choose the duration of the model period an initial
period, a functional form for the distribution function of the match values, G(z), and a value
for every parameter in the model economy. These parameters are the maximum life-time, J;
the fecundity pro￿les; the mortality probabilities, ￿i
j;t; the fraction of people born of gender i;
$i
t, the search friction parameter ￿, the discount factor, ￿; and the parameters that characterize
the payo⁄s, the desired number of children per period, kt , and the period utility of remaining
single, A:
The model period. I assume the period in the model is yearly. The model starts in 1930 but
the ￿rst period where the stocks of men and women entering the market are actually "produced"
by the model is 1945. Between 1930 and 1945 the initial stocks of men and women are taken
from fertility data.
Expectations. Given that in this model the baby boom is exogenous, I will make some

















I assume that the parameter ￿ in expression (52) is equal to zero for all years before 1965. In
other words, I assume that before and during the baby boom people form their expectations
for the next period by observing the environment faced by singles who are one year older in
20the current period. Between 1965 and 1973, I assume that ￿ increases linearly and from 1974
onwards I assume ￿ = 1; relaxing the previous assumption.26 This assumption is made to model
the "baby boom" as an unanticipated shock in desired fertility. Therefore I am ruling out the
possibility of, for example, an agent trying to anticipate (delay) marry in 1940 (1960) because
she is foreseeing that ten years later her desired number of children will be considerably higher
(lower). Remember also that the main object of this study is to analyze marriage behavior once
the baby boom is over.27
The time discount factor. I choose ￿ = 0:96, as is standard in the literature.
The distribution of the match values. I assume that the distribution of match values, G(z),
is the logarithm of normally distributed function with mean 0 and standard deviation ￿.
The maximum life-time. I assume that J = 75.
The mortality probabilities. The mortality probabilities are death rates taken from the Hu-
man Mortality Database for the years 1933-2006.28;29
The fraction of people born by gender. I use the sex ratios at birth for 1940-2002 from
Mathews and Hamilton (2005).
The fecundity pro￿les. The assumptions on fecundity pro￿les are detailed in expression
(40). These values are chosen so that the fecundity pro￿les in the model economy are roughly
consistent with the ￿ndings of the literature on the subject.30
To complete the calibration of the benchmark model economy we are left with three free
parameters and a vector of the number of desired children per period, kt: The free parameters are
the standard deviation of the distribution of match values, ￿; the matching function parameter,
￿ and the period utility of remaining single, A. I will proceed in two steps. First, to obtain an
initial state for this economy, I assume that the economy is in the steady state and choose the
numerical values of these three free parameters using three targets from the 1930 U.S. census.
These targets are the fraction of ever married men, the fraction of ever married women and the
ratio 15-29 / 15-44 year-olds. For this initial state, I choose k1 = 3:1; the average total fertility
rate during the period 1920-29. Therefore, I choose the values of ￿, ￿, and A that minimize
the sum of the squared di⁄erences between outcomes in the model economy and our United
States targets. The values the parameters that deliver this result are ￿ = 0:495, ￿ = 0:38, and
A = 1:31: Observe in Table 1, in addition to the model targets, the values of the median age
at ￿rst marriage for men and women, the mean of age di⁄erences and the sex ratio for never
married people.31 All these model￿ s measures are very close to the U.S data except for women
marrying around one year later than in the data. This di⁄erence will remain when whe compare
the model dynamics with the time series.
The desired number of children. Once I obtained the parameters for the steady state, the next
step is to construct the vector of desired number of children per period, kt in order to analyze
the dynamic of agents￿behavior. As stated before, I use the Total Fertility Rates (TFR) for
the period 1940- 2000, and for crude birth rates from 1920-1939 all provided by the NCHS.33
26The results are basically the same if ￿ is either a concave or convex function of time between 1965 and 1973.
27One alternative assumption would have been considering that only some specifc cohorts were a⁄ected by the
boom. However, data shows that during the complete period age-speci￿c fertility increased for all age groups.
28The Human Mortality Database is compiled by the University of California, Berkeley (USA) and the Max
Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). This dataset is available at www.mortality.org.
29I use the 2006 mortality rates for 2007 onwards.
30For example Hassan and Killick (2003) and Wood and Weinstein (1988), discussed above.
31Note that the mean age di⁄erence is not the di⁄erence between the median age art ￿rst marriage. As stated
above the median age at ￿rst marriage is that age when 50% of the poulation has already married and is the
standard measure of marriage timing.
33The total fertility rate computed by the National Center of Health Statistics is the sum of the birth rates
211930 Census32 Model
Median age at ￿rst marriage for men 24.27 24.33
Median age at ￿rst marriage for women 21.41 22.57
Mean Age di⁄erence at ￿rst marriage (years) 2.86 2.81
Fraction ever married men * 0.66 0.66
Fraction ever married women * 0.73 0.72
Sex ratio for never married people 1.32 1.23
Ratio 15-29 /15-44 years-old * 0.54 0.54
* Calibration targets.
Table 1: The Initial (steady state) Economy and the 1930 U.S. Census
Speci￿cally I run the following OLS regression, for the period 1930-65,




i + "t; (53)
where ￿0s are the estimated parameters of the regression. In addition, I will assume that the
economy reaches eventually a steady state where population growth is equal to zero. Therefore,
using the parameters chosen previously obtain the values of kt that, in the steady state produces
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i if 1930 ￿ t ￿ 1965
kT + (k1965 ￿ kT)e￿0:3t if 1966 ￿ t ￿ 1976
kT if t ￿ 1977
(54)
where the expression in the second line of (54) ensures that desired fertility converges smoothly
to their steady state value (in 1977). Observe ￿nally that the parameter ￿0 in expression (54)
is di⁄erent from the constant term ￿0 in (53): Since the fertility rate in the model depends on
marriage probabilities, ￿0 becomes a fourth free parameter chosen to minimize the sum square
di⁄erences between the TFR in the data and those produced by the model.
Given the previous choices, the evolution of the TFR in the data and the model is displayed
in Panel (a) of Figure 2. Two vertical dashed lines are shown in the ￿gure: the ￿rst one shows
the peak on the total fertility rate, in 1957, while the second is located in 1985, which will be
the starting point of our analysis. Notice that by 1985 U.S. fertility rates are in the process of
recovery after having reached their minimum level in 1977. Observe that the model￿ s fertility
is almost reaching its steady state level, given the parameters were set at a constant level since
1977 (see expression(54)). Therefore, I chose a "conservative" starting point to ensure that all
changes in model￿ s variables come from model dynamics.
The key force a⁄ecting model dynamics is the age structure of the population. As a measure
of age structure, I choose the fraction of 15-29 over 15-44 years old (from now on, "the fraction
of mothers in 5-year age groups multiplied by ￿ve. The birth rates are the numbers of live births per 1,000
women in a given age group. Beginning in 1970, the total fertility rate excludes the children born by nonresidents.
The National Center of Health Statistics data is available at www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/t991x07.pdf.Data
on birth rates for the period 1909-2000 is available from www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/t001x01.pdf.
22Men Women
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
Data Model Data Model
1957 22.6 23.3 20.3 21.4
1985 25.5 25.1 23.3 24.2
2009 28.1 25.7 25.9 24.2
2040 26.2 24.5
4 1957-1985 2.9 1.8 3.0 2.8
4 1985-2009 2.6 0.6 2.6 0.0
4 2009-2040 0.5 0.3
Table 2: Median age at ￿rst marriage: Benchmark and U.S. data
of young people") whose evolution compared with U.S. data is shown in Panel (b) of Figure 2.34
Notice that this demographic measure reaches its maximum in 1975 (at a time when the ￿rst
baby boomers, born starting in 1946, are about to turn 30 years old) and then minimum in 1995
(when those born at the end of the baby boom turn 30). Notice that the model economy shows
a new maximum before 2020, which indicates that the cohort of children of early baby boomers
(born around 1980), will turn 30. Observe ￿nally that the fraction of young people would reach
its own steady state value (0.5) between 2030 and 2040, which implies that fertility rates reach
their steady state around 1990 despite the fact that all model parameters have been constant
since 1977.
5. Findings
5.1. Median Age at First Marriage
As stated above, the objective of the extended model developed in the previous section is to
study a potential causal e⁄ect from demographic changes to marital behavior. Speci￿cally, I
study if the demographic change originated by the baby boom that took place mainly in the
1950￿ s and early 1960￿ s had any impact in the marriage timing of the generations born during
and after the baby boom.
Table 2 and Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2 show the evolution of the median age at ￿rst
marriage in the model and U.S. data, for men and women respectively. Panel (c) shows that
men￿ s age in the model closely follows the evolution of the data from 1940 to the early 1980￿ s.
Then, while in the data men￿ s age continues increasing up to around 28.1 years old in 2009, in
our benchmark economy it increases at a slower pace. Since the inverse relationship between
fertility and age of marriage is well-known by demographers, it seems particularly interesting
to study the increase in the age of marriage that occurred after the fertility rate reached its
historical minimum, during the late seventies. As shown in Column 1 of Table 2, men￿ s median
age at ￿rst marriage increased by 2.6 years between 1985 and 2009, while, during the same
period the model shows an increase of 0.6 years, 23% of the variation in the data. Notice that
men￿ s age only reaches its steady state level around 2040 (with an additional increase of 0.4
years), so the transitional dynamics of the model are able to account for a one year increase in
men￿ s median age of marriage since 1985. The comparison for women is shown in Panel (d) of
34Data of the age structure of the population is taken from the Interim State Population Projections from the
U.S. Census Bureau.
23Figure 2 and Column 2 of Table 2. Note that women in the model are more than one year older
than in the data in the initial state (see Table 1 above), and of course that initial divergence
make the evolution of women￿ s age at ￿rst marriage in the model follow the data less closely
than in the case of men. Moreover, the increase in the period 1985-2009 is negligible and only
accounts for an increase of 0.3 years from 1985 to the steady state.
The last two panels of Figure 2 display comparisons of important variables that merit being
shown despite their data limitations. The evolution of the average age gap at ￿rst marriage is
shown in Panel (e) from 1940 to 1995.35;36 In this case the decrease in the benchmark model￿ s
age gap appears to be greater than what the data shows. Notice that since the early 1990￿ s the
model gap starts to recover, but unfortunately NCHS did not collect data after 1995. Finally,
Panel (f) displays the evolution of the ratio single men/ single women), in the model and in the
U.S. Census (only decennial data is available until 2000). Note in this case that in both cases
the sex ratio increases during the baby boom and then decreases. However, the model sex ratio
recovers as of the late1980￿ s before reaching its steady state level, di⁄erent from the pattern
observed in decennial data, which shows a decrease in the sex ratio between the 1990 and 2000
censuses.
5.2. The Benchmark Model Economy
In this section I explore the benchmark economy in more detail, in order to better understand the
previous ￿ndings of a slow convergence of men￿ s age at marriage and the age gap to the steady
state. Before starting, I would like to focus brie￿ y on what happened during the baby boom. The
￿rst four Panels of Figure 3 are a clear example of Propositions 5 and 7: the population become
younger (Panel (b)), men and women marry younger (Panel (c) and there is an increase in the
sex ratio and the age gap (Panel (d)). However, di⁄erent from the model developed in Section
2, this is not a steady state economy and the changes on the age structure of the population,
with a lag of around two decades from the fertility boom, are only temporary. Here I argue that
the changes in demographic structure caused by the "baby boom" are behind the persistence
mechanism that generates a slow adjustment in the age of marriage after the boom is over.
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3 show the comparative evolution of the fraction of young
people with the TFR and the single sex ratio, respectively. Observe ￿rst that the evolution age
structure of the population virtually mirrors the TFR with a 20-year lag, falling below its steady
state level during the 1990￿ s and the early 2000￿ s. In other words, the minimum in the ratio of
young people occurs when the generation of younger people born at times of the lowest fertility
rates (late 1970￿ s to early 1980￿ s) are in their late teens or their twenties. These younger people
are the children of baby boomers, a large cohort in absolute value, but small if we compare
it with the previous cohorts, which explain the drop in the fraction of young people. Second,
when comparing the single sex ratio, which is a key determinant of meeting rates, with the
fraction of young people, we can observe a negative correlation between the two demographic
measures, especially after the peak of the fertility rates in 1957 and until the early 1980￿ s. After
the imbalance produced in the sex ratio during the baby boom, the arrival of larger cohorts of
younger people to the marriage market helped to balance the sex ratio relatively quickly (late
35In order to calculate the average age gap we need data on actual marriages. Although highly correlated, the
age gap is not an equivalent measure to the di⁄erence in median age at marriage (taken from the fraction of ever
married population from either Census data or the Current population Survey.), which are relative measures of
marriage timing within a cohort.
36 Unfortunately, there are not consistent series of the age at ￿rst marriage for the whole period under consid-
eration. See Footnote 1 (pp. 2).
241960￿ s and 1970￿ s). Beginning in the early 1980￿ s, the single sex ratio recovers, mainly during
the period where the fraction of young people was also below its steady state level.
In Panel (c) I compare the median age at ￿rst marriage with the TFR, while Panel (d) shows
that the high correlation between the age di⁄erence and the single sex ratio, which, despite the
data limitations, seems to be consistent with the evolution shown in Panel (e) of Figure 1.
Notice that, after reaching a minimum in 1957 (the peak of fertility rates), the median age at
￿rst marriage of both men and women started to recover, with women￿ s recovery beginning
earlier and at a much more rapid pace than men￿ s. Observe also that if we either look at the
di⁄erences in timing (median ages at ￿rst marriage Panel (c)) or to the mean of age gap at
marriage directly (Panel (d)), the gap seems to shrink from the peak of the baby boom to the
early eighties and then to increase again, to reach a steady state that is lower than the initial
state. Moreover, Panel (d) shows that the evolution of the single sex ratio and that of the age
gap seem to mirror each other.37
The last two panels of Figure 3 show the evolution of two model variables that may be helpful
in order to understand the mechanism behind the results. Panel (e) shows the expected value
of being in the marriage market at ages 25 and 30, which is V i
a;t from expression (??); with
i 2 fm;wg and a 2 f25;35g. As may be expected, the value of marriage increases for both 25
year-old men and women during the baby boom (reaching a peak in 1957) and then stabilizes
in the early nineties. Notice that the case of 35 year-olds is di⁄erent: while for men it replicates
the pattern of 25 year-olds at a lower level, the search value for 35 year-old women sharply
decreases during the baby boom and then recover during the seventies, as fertility decreases.
The narrowing of the gap between the value of search of 25 and 35 year-old women can be seen
as a relative increase in the value of waiting and helps to explain why women￿ s median age at
￿rst marriage recovers more rapidly than men￿ s.
Finally, in Panel (f) of Figure 3, I show the evolution of the probability of receiving a
proposal at ages 25 and 35 for men and women. We de￿ne the probability that a man of age a
receives a marriage proposal from a woman of age b as the probability of meeting such a woman
(￿m
b;t from expression (39)) times the probability that she is willing to marry a man of age a;
f1 ￿ G[Rw







b;t f1 ￿ G[Rw
t (b;25)]g (55)
Since proposals are determined by the other gender￿ s reservation value, here we can see the
asymmetric market faced by men and women during and after the baby boom. Notice again
that during the baby boom, 35 year-old women are less likely to receive a marriage proposal
than men of their same cohort. At the end of the baby boom, proposals for older women increase
sharply, explaining the pattern of the value of search in Panel (e).
So far I have presented arguments to justify why women￿ s age at marriage increased more
rapidly than men￿ s after the baby boom. However, the reason for the slow adjustment in men￿ s
age remains to be explained. In the next sections I perform two counterfactual experiments to
explain that slow adjustment. In the ￿rst experiment, I assume that there is not such an increase
in desired fertility from the mid 1940￿ s to the 1960￿ s, as if the "baby boom" had never occurred.
In the second experiment, the economy is just like in the benchmark but there is no population
growth. Therefore, I "shut down" the general equilibrium e⁄ect caused by the changes in the
demographic structure. Therefore, the goal of this second experiment is to isolate the persistence
37See the interpretation of Proposition 7 on page 16.
25mechanism that may have a⁄ected the marriage behavior of the cohorts born during the baby
boom.
5.3. Counterfactual Experiment I: "No baby boom"
In the ￿rst counterfactual experiment, I assume that kt converges slowly from the initial level
(before 1940) to the steady state (replacement rate). The results of this experiment are shown
in Figure 4 and in columns (2) and (5) of Table 3. Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows the nature of the
experiment. Notice that fertility rates fall slowly from 1940 to reach their steady state values in
1990. By "eliminating" the baby boom, the structure of the population is only slightly a⁄ected
and reaches its steady state value by the year 2000, with the population slightly "older" than in
the initial state. Panel (b) shows the evolution of the median age at ￿rst marriage for men and
women. As shown in the ￿gure, if the baby boom had not occurred, the age at ￿rst marriage
for men and women would have slowly risen to a new state level.38
Notice, however, that the convergence in marriage timing with the benchmark model occurs
much later than the convergence in fertility rates (around 1990). As shown in Table 3, for
example in 2005 men￿ s median age at marriage was 0.5 years higher than in the benchmark
model, while women￿ s age was 0.3 years higher.
As fertility rates decrease from 1940￿ s to early 1980, we observe an "older" age structure of
the population (Panel (c)), together with a joint decrease in the sex ratio and in the age gap
(Panels (d) and (e))). However, when fertility rates stabilize, the sex ratio is below its steady
state level, as in the benchmark model. Therefore, as of the early 1980￿ s the age gap starts
recovering, and so does the sex ratio, to reach their new steady state. Observe also in Panel (f)
that proposals received for both men and women are below the benchmark.
The connection between the slow convergence in the age at marriage and demographic struc-
ture is suggested by the evolution of marriage proposals shown in Panel (f). Notice that if the
baby boom had not occurred, the period probability of receiving a marriage proposal would
have been lower than in the benchmark model for both men and women, to converge as the
demographic structure is getting closer to its steady state value.
In order to investigate further the connection between the demographic structure and the
age of marriage, in the next experiment the economy will be like that in the benchmark model
during the baby boom period. However, I will assume that the baby boom does not a⁄ect the
age structure of the population, in order to isolate the general equilibrium e⁄ect caused by the
demographic structure.
5.4. Counterfactual Experiment II: Constant In￿ ow of 15 year-olds
In this experiment I assume that, every period, the in￿ ow rate of 15 year-olds to the economy
is constant, regardless of what happens with fertility rates. As shown in Panel (a) of Figure 5,
in this case, the evolution of fertility rates mimics those in the benchmark model, but the age
structure of the population is constant. As a consequence, men￿ s age at ￿rst marriage recovers
much more rapidly than in the benchmark economy, starting to increase in 1957 reaching levels
38If we look at these ￿ndings in light of Proposition 7 , as a result of a permanent decrease in desired fertility we
should expect women marrying unambiguously older, with the impact on men￿ s age at marriage being ambiguous.
The two countervailing e⁄ects on men￿ s age at marriage are, on the one hand, a decrease in search friction because
they will be more eager to marry older women. On the other hand, the "aging" structure of the population will
induce them to marry older (see the interpretation of the analytical results on pp. 16). In this case it appears
that the second factor is playing a more important role.
26Men Women
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benchmark No boom Constant Benchmark No boom Constant
1957 23.3 25.0 23.3 21.4 23.9 21.4
1985 25.1 25.7 25.9 24.2 24.4 24.2
2009 25.7 26.0 26.0 24.2 24.4 24.4
2040 26.2 26.2 26.2 24.5 24.5 24.5
4 1957-1985 1.8 0.7 2.6 2.8 0.4 2.8
4 1985-2009 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
4 2009-2040 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
Table 3: Median age at ￿rst marriage: Benchmark and Counterfactual Experiments
close to their steady state in the early 1980￿ s (see Panel (b)). For example, Table 3 shows that
in 1985 the age of marriage of men is 0.8 years higher with constant in￿ ow of the population
compared to the benchmark economy. In the case of women, the evolution is much closer to the
one in the benchmark economy, but there is also a slow adjustment to the steady state, albeit
small.
If we look at the evolution of the sex ratio on Panel (d), we see that in both the benchmark
and the counterfactual economy, the sex ratio starts rising with the baby boom, because of
the incentives driven by di⁄erential fecundity analyzed in Section 2. In the partial equilibrium
case the sex ratio continues increasing until around 1965, and only starts decreasing when the
fertility rates plummeted during the late 1960￿ s, to reach its steady state level in the late 1990￿ s,
almost simultaneously with the TFR. As desired fertility remains high, keeping everything else
constant, the sex ratio would mechanically continue growing, because it is already unbalanced
(due to the initial shock) and any new marriage takes one man and one woman out of the
market. However, in the benchmark economy, the sex ratio starts decreasing in the late 1950￿ s,
falling below its steady state levels around the mid eighties and then recovering to reach the
steady state only around the year 2040. The evolution of the age gap, shown in Panel (e) is
a mirror of what happen with the sex ratio. While in the partial equilibrium experiment the
age di⁄erence decreases smoothly towards the steady state once the baby boom is over, in the
benchmark economy it decreases sharply below the steady state level and recovers to reach the
steady state only forty years later.
The factor behind the slower adjustment patterns in the benchmark model with respect to
this partial equilibrium experiment is the entrance of the ￿rst baby boomers in the economy
before the baby boom is over (i.e. between 1960 and 1965, see Panel (a)). Even though the
asymmetries in the incentives about marriage timing between men and women remain high until
the mid 1960￿ s, the fact that larger, sex balanced cohorts enter the economy prevents the sex
ratio from continuing to grow. Therefore, when the baby boom is over, the sex ratio and the age
gap will decrease sharply, not only because women￿ s biological constraints become less binding,
but also because the demographic structure is temporarily "younger" due to the baby boomers
cohorts.
As the temporary change in the age structure of the population delays the adjustment of
the sex ratio to the steady state, it also alters the matching process and therefore the timing
of marriage. As shown in Panel (f), although both men and women receives more proposals
than in the steady state, because the larger cohorts of young people create "a thicker market
externality", the impact is sizable for men, since they face relatively higher meeting rates than
27women. As men keep receiving relatively more proposals due to the impact of age structure of
the population on the sex ratio, their median age at ￿rst marriage will slowly adjust toward its
steady state as the demographic structure ￿nds its own steady state level.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I develop an equilibrium, two-sided search model of marriage with endogenous
population growth to study the interaction between fertility, the age structure of the population
and the age at ￿rst marriage of men and women. I show that, given an increase in the desired
number of children (which is an exogenous parameter in this model), age at marriage is a⁄ected
through two di⁄erent channels. First, as population growth, the age structure of the population
acts as a "thicker market" externality, inducing early marriages. The second channel comes from
di⁄erential fecundity: if the desired number of children is not feasible for older women, young
women become relatively less choosy than young men. In equilibrium, women are more likely
to marry older men and single men outnumber single women.
The results above have dynamic implications that are consistent with observed patterns in
the U.S. data, speci￿cally after the "baby boom" period, which in the context of the model can
be seen as a temporary increase of desired fertility. The main ￿nding that the change in the
demographic structure caused by the entrance of "baby boomers" in the marriage markets acts
as a persistence mechanism, a⁄ecting marriage timing. Speci￿cally, I found that the change in
demographic structure may have delayed the adjustment in the sex ratio after the baby boom,
increasing matching rates of men relative to those of women.
Even though that this stylized model is not able to account for all the factors that may have
in￿ uenced the continuous increase in the age of marriage since the mid-seventies, it provides a
link, demographic composition, to reconcile the evolution of fertility rates with time series of the
age of marriage. However, as fertility rates reached the replacement rates in the U.S. decades
ago, the biological time frame for women to have two children in their lifetime is so wide that
additional structure would be necessary to study further the causes of the changes in marriage
timing.
The marriage market model developed in this article can be easily extended to a richer
environment that includes human capital accumulation, labor supply and fertility choice in
order to make a quantitative analysis of the dynamics of marriage in the last few decades. The
results above suggest that the baby boom may have a⁄ected the marriage behavior of baby
boomers themselves through identi￿able, persistence factors, whose study requires going beyond
standard, comparative static analysis.
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30A. Technical Appendix
A.1. Existence
To proof existence, I will make use of Brouwer￿ s Fixed Point Theorem to show that the following
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: The ￿rst step is to show that
￿(:) is continuous. The continuity of ￿(:) is ensured because of the continuity of Gw (:)and
Gm (:) and the boundaries of the ratio single men/single women. The next step is to show





0 2 [0;x]; ￿m
0 2 [0;1]; ￿w 2 [0;1] and n0 2 [￿0:5;(k ￿ 1)]: I have to show that







Consider ￿rst the case of ￿1: By simply observation of equation (57), we know that ￿1 (￿0) ￿


















2 (0;1): Therefore, evaluating ￿1 at k = x
￿x (by
condition (5)); we have




























31which implies that ￿1 = Rm
1;2 2 [￿x;x):

























2 (0;1); whe have,
￿2 (￿0) = ￿
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0 )[1 ￿ Gw (Rm
0 )]g 2 (0;1): (61)
Therefore ￿2 = ￿m 2 (0;1): This trivially implies ￿m
1;1 = ￿w
1;1 > 0:
A similar argument can be used to show that ￿3 = ￿w 2 (0;1): Notice that the fact that










> 0: In addition,
Rm
1;2 < x; as shown above. Therefore, we have that ￿m
1;2 > 0 and ￿w
1;2 > 0; which, by (34) and
(35); imply ￿w
2;1 > 0 and ￿m
2;1 > 0:
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: Therefore an interior steady state
equilibrium exists for this economy
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3 (symmetric equilibrium)
I have to show that when Gm = Gw = G and k 2 [1
2;1); the point ￿s = (￿;￿s;￿s;ns) is a
solution of ￿(:):39 Plugging ￿s into ￿(:), making k < 1 and manipulating we get
￿2 (￿s) = ￿
￿
2 + ns ￿ ￿s
2 + ns ￿ ￿s
￿￿￿1 ￿￿
1 + ns





































+ k(1 ￿ ￿s):
Therefore ￿s is an equilibrium of ￿(:) and satis￿es
￿m = ￿w 2 (0;1)
n 2 (￿0:5;0):
Given that ￿m = ￿w; it is straightforward that the number of single old men equal the
number of old single women, sm
2;t = sw
2;t = (1 + n)
t￿1 (1 ￿ ￿s) (by (26)); which makes Sm
t = Sw
t :















32A.3. Proof of Proposition 4 (uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium)











































2k ￿1 ￿ Rm
1;1
i
, z2 = [￿2 ￿ ￿m], z3 = [￿3 ￿ ￿w] and z4 is given by equation
(31):40 In Proposition 3 whe found that the point ￿s = (￿s;￿s;ns) is a solution of ￿(:):To
show the uniqueness of ￿s using the Implicit Function Theorem, we need continuity in all the
parcial derivatives of z(:). We also need that Jacobian determinant of z(:) with respect to the
endogenous variables is nonzero when evaluated at ￿s. We know that the system continuous
and di⁄erentiable for k 2 [1
2;1); being their partial derivatives also continuous because g is
di⁄erentiable.41
Given that under symmetry Rm
1;1 =
￿





























5 6= 0: (63)
Calculating the partial derivatives of z(:) and manipulating, we get
jJj =
1
(2 + ns ￿ ￿s)
3 (2 + ns ￿ ￿[1 ￿ G(￿)])
n
(2 + ns ￿ ￿s)
2 (2 + 2n ￿ k￿s) +













Given that by assumption ￿ ￿ 1
2 and that always ns ￿ ￿1
2; we have that (2 + ns ￿ ￿[1 ￿ G(￿)]) >
0: Therefore jJj will be positive if the expresion under curly brackets, fx1 + x2 ￿ x3g > 0;
where x1 = (2 + ns ￿ ￿s)











:We clearly have that x1 > 0 x2 > 0: In the case of x3, the log-










and therefore x3 ￿ 0 and x2 ￿ x3 ￿ 0:42 However, given that jx3j ￿ G(￿): it is su¢ cient that
￿ ￿ 1
2 to have jx1j > jx2j ￿ jx3j. Therefore jJj > 0 which implies that the equilibrium is unique.




41The system z(:) is not di⁄erentiable at k = 1; that is, the right hand side and the left hand side derivatives
with respect to k are not equal. However, z(:) is continuous in k and di⁄erentiable for the intervals k 2 [
1
2;1)
and k 2 (1;k]:
42Log-concave probability densisities have the "New is better than used" (NBU) property: [1 ￿ F (x + y)] ￿
[1 ￿ F (x)][1 ￿ F (y)]: Making x = y =
￿










￿ F (￿): See An (2003).
33A.4. Proof of Proposition 5 (comparative statics of the symmetric equilibrium).
In Proposition 4 we found that jJj > 0; which allows us to de￿ne ￿s and ns as implicit functions
of k in a neighborhood of any point ￿s that is a solution of the system z(:) de￿ned in (62):
Given that z(:) has a unique solution for each value of k 2 [1
2;1); the following results hold for
the whole interval:
Now I turn to comparative statics. Applying Cramer￿ s rule, the derivatives of the endogenous
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@k =
jJ4j
jJj ; where where jJj is
de￿ned in (63) and jJ2j and jJ4j are obtained by replacing ￿zik = ￿@zi
@k for i = f2;3;4g in the
respective column of jJj. Therefore we have,
jJ2j = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿s)
(2 + ns ￿ ￿s)
























￿ 0 (by (64)), we have that jJ1j > 0: Therefore
@￿s
@k






(2 + ns ￿ ￿[1 ￿ G(￿)])
(2 + ns ￿ ￿s)
3
n
(2 + ns ￿ ￿s)





















+ G(￿) ￿ G(￿): Given that ￿ ￿ 1
2; it must follow that jJ4j > 0: Therefore
@n
@k




Finally, since q1 = 1+n
2+n; it must follow that
@q1
@k > 0:
A.5. Proof of Proposition 7 (comparative statics of the di⁄erential fecundity equi-
librium).
To show the comparative statics with di⁄erential fecundity we use the system de￿ned in (62):
Given than now k 2 (1;k], z1 is de￿ned by (20) and we work with the full system of four
equations in four unknowns. For tractability I pick a point s0 de￿ned by the unique solution of
the system at k = 1: Since the right-hand side derivatives of z(:) are de￿ned and are continuous
for k = 1, we are able to make local comparative statics for the neighborhood of ￿0
s (for k = 1+￿;
for ￿ small). First of all, we have to show that the Jacobian of the full system, jHj is nonzero
when evaluated at ￿0
s: Calculating the partial derivatives of z(:) and manipulating, we get
jHj =

















Therefore, we can de￿ne Rm
1;1, ￿m, ￿w and n as implicit functions of k in a neighborhood of
￿0















jHj ; where jH1j; jH2j; jH3j and jH4j are
obtained by replacing ￿zik = ￿@zi
@k for i = f1;2;3;4g in the respective column of jHj.
Now I will show that in a neighborhood of ￿0
s we have that, given an increase in k:
341. Young men are less choosy with young women and choosier with old women:
@Rm
11

































k = 1): On the other hand, we have that young men become choosier with respect to old
women. By (21);Rm
12 = 2kRm






















2. Probability of marriage
(a) Women marry young with higher probability.
To show that @￿w

































2 ￿ ￿s ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿2￿
￿




(2 ￿ ￿s)(1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿) + ￿2G(￿)
2 (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿s))
i










We know by (64) that the ￿rst line is positive. Recalling that ￿ ￿ 1
2; it is also clear
that the second, fourth and ￿fth lines are also positive. In the the third line we
have ￿1 < (1 + ￿(3 ￿ 2￿s))￿2 < 0: However, at k = 1 we have ￿ = 1 which implies
￿s ￿ ￿ and
￿
2 ￿ ￿s ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿2￿
￿
￿ 1: Therefore, the third line is also positive
and jH3j > 0; which implies @￿w
@k > 0 given that jHj > 0:
(b) The di⁄erence between the probability of marriage at age 1 of women and men, ￿w ￿









(1 ￿ ￿s)￿￿(2 ￿ ￿s + ￿[1 ￿ G(￿)])g (￿)
(2 ￿ ￿s)(2 ￿ ￿s ￿ ￿[1 ￿ G(￿)])
> 0
3. The ratio of single men to single women, ￿, is greater than 1 and increasing in k.
From (26) we know that sm
2;t = sm
1;t￿1 (1 ￿ ￿m) and sw
2;t = sw





2;t because ￿w > ￿m: Therefore Sm
t > Sw
t and ￿ > 1: Furthermore, since @￿w
@k >
@￿m
@k ; we have
@￿
@k > 0:









It is straightforward that here we also have
@q1
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year
Age difference TFR
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1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
year
single sex ratio total sex ratio
(f) Single and total sex ratio (ages 15-44).







































































































































































































































































































































(f) Ratio single men / single women (15-44).






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(f) Proposal probabilities at ages 25 and 35.
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1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
year
Men (No baby boom) Men Benchmark
Women (No baby boom) Women Benchmark
(f) Proposal probabilities at age 25.


























































































































































































































































































































































1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
year
Men (Constant inflow) Men Benchmark
Women (Constant inflow) Women Benchmark
(f) Proposal probabilities at age 25.
Figure 5: Counterfactual Economy II (Constant population in￿ ow).
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